《Fuel Cells: Current Technology Challenges and Future Research Needs》
《Fuel Cells: Current Technology Challenges and Future Research Needs》燃料电池：目前的技术挑战和未来的研究需要
作者： Noriko Hikosaka Behling
出版社：Elsevier
出版时间：2013年
目录
Preface Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1. William Grove Invents the Fuel Cell 1.2. Fuel Cells: Commercial Success Remains Elusive 1.3. The Unfulfilled Promise References
Chapter 2. Fuel Cells and the Challenges Ahead 2.1. What Is A Fuel Cell? 2.1.1. The Unit Cell: A Simple But Formidable Device 2.1.2. Fuel Cell Stacks: Planar or Tubular Designs 2.1.3. Fuel Cell Systems 2.2. Types Of Fuel Cells: Distinct Technologies 2.3. Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cells 2.3.1. Principles of Operation and Characteristics 2.3.2. Another Daunting Problem: Electrolyte Performance 2.3.3. Challenges with Transport Applications 2.4. Direct Methanol Fuel Cells 2.4.1. Principles of Operation and Characteristics 2.4.2. Experiencing the Same Problems as PEMFCs And More 2.4.3. Challenges with Portable Applications 2.5. Alkaline Fuel Cells 2.5.1. Principles of Operation and Characteristics 2.5.2. An Early Success, Major Setbacks, Then Redemption, But… 2.6. Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cells 2.6.1. Principles of Operation 2.6.2. The Presumptive "First Generation" Commercial Fuel Cell 2.6.3. Inferior and Expensive 2.7. Molten Carbonate Fuel Cells 2.7.1. Principles of Operation 2.7.2. The Presumptive "Second Generation" Commercial Fuel 2.7.3. Not Durable Enough and Still Expensive 2.8. Solid Oxide Fuel Cells 2.8.1. Principles of Operation and Characteristics 2.8.2. An Early Favorite: High Temperature Tubular Cells 2.8.3. Brief Exploration of High Temperature Planar Cells 2.8.4. The Current Target: Intermediate Temperature Planar Cells, Many Problems Remain 2.8.5. Are Alternative Cell Designs Feasible? References
Chapter 3. History of Alkaline Fuel Cells 3.1. Overview 3.2. Francis T. Bacon Builds The First Alkaline Fuel Cell 3.3. AFC Development in the United States 3.3.1. United Technologies Corporation Achieves Spectacular Success with AFCs in Space 3.3.2. Union Carbide Corporation: Vigorous Efforts but No Successes 3.3.3. Allis Chalmers: Sharing the Same Fate as UCC 3.4. AFC Development in Europe: Decades of Work With No Significant Consequence..But Some Field Tests Continue 3.4.1. AFC Development in Germany 3.4.2. AFC Development in France 3.4.3. AFC Development in Belgium: Elenco 3.4.4. AFC Development in Sweden: ASEA 3.4.5. AFC Development in UK: AFC Energy 3.5. AFC Development in Russia: Sustained Effort, But With Little Commercial Success 3.5.1. Kiev Research and Production Association "KVANT" 3.5.2. S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation RSC "ENERGIA" 3.5.3. Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant 3.5.4. ZAO Independent Power Technologies 3.5.5. No Commercial Success in the Near Term 3.6. AFC Development in Japan: Limited Activities of No Consequence..But A New Effort Emerges 3.6.1. Fuji Electric 3.6.2. Hitachi 3.6.3. Japan Storage Battery 3.6.4. Sanyo 3.6.5. Panasonic 3.6.6. Daihatsu Motor References
Chapter 4. History of Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cells 4.1. Overview 4.2. PAFC Development in the United States: 25 Years of Government Programs Fail to Produce a Cost-Competitive PAFC System 4.2.1. US Army’s PAFC Programs 4.2.2. US Air Force PAFC Programs 4.2.3. PAFC Programs for Stationary Applications: United Technologies Corporation (UTC) Prevails 4.2.3.1. TARGET Program 4.2.3.2. GRI-DOE Project 4.2.3.3. FCG-1 (Fuel Cell Generator 1) Project 4.2.4. Other PAFC Programs in the United States 4.2.4.1. Engelhard 4.2.4.2. Energy Research Corporation (ERC) 4.2.4.3. Westinghouse 4.2.5. PAFC Programs for Transport Applications: No Successes 4.2.6. US PAFC Subsidy Programs 4.2.6.1. US Department of Defense Demonstration Program 4.2.6.2. DoD Climate Change Fuel Cell Rebate Program 4.2.6.3. Federal and State Tax Credit Programs Implemented 4.2.7. A Major New Hope Emerges.But Results in Little Consequence 4.3. PAFC Development in Japan 4.3.1. Japanese Private-Sector PAFC Activities Begin in the 1960s 4.3.1.1. Japanese Utility Companies Engage in Field-Testing of US PAFC Power Plants 4.3.1.2. Japanese Electric Machinery Companies Launch PAFC Development 4.3.2. Japanese Government Launches PAFC Program in 1981 4.3.2.1. METI’s Moonlight Project 4.3.2.2. Other METI PAFC Programs 4.3.3. Government and Private Sector Join Hands in Field Test Program 4.3.3.1. METI PAFC Field Test Program 4.3.3.2. Private-Sector Field-Test Activities 4.3.4. Japanese Fuel Cell Subsidy Programs: Funding One-Third to Two-Thirds of Acquisition Cost 4.3.5. PAFC Power Plants Are Not a Commercial Success 4.3.6. Government Evaluates PAFC R&D Program as Inadequate 4.4. PAFC Development in Other Countries: Primarily Test-Operating US and Japanese PAFC Power Plants 4.4.1. European Countries 4.4.2. The Rest of the World 4.4.3. Again, No Measurable Commercial Success References
Chapter 5. History of Molten Carbonate Fuel Cells 5.1. MCFC Effort Starts in the Netherlands in the 1950S 5.2. MCFC Development in the United States 5.2.1. Early Efforts 5.2.1.1. The US Army: Early MCFC Supporter 5.2.1.2. The Institute of Gas Technology: Early MCFC Developer 5.2.2. The Department of Energy: Initiating MCFC R&D Program in 1975 5.2.2.1. MCFC Development Program in the 1980s: GE and UTC Emerge as Prime Contractors 5.2.2.2. MCFC Demonstration Program in the 1990s: Fuel Cell Energy and M-C Power as Primary Developers 5.2.3. Commercial Success Still Uncertain 5.3. MCFC Development in Japan 5.3.1. Government Plays Dominant Role–Limited Activities in Private Sector 5.3.2. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry Starts MCFC Development Program in 1981 5.3.2.1. Phase I MCFC Development (1981-1986): Five Companies Participate in 10kW Stack Development 5.3.2.2. Phase II MCFC Development (1987-1999): Three Companies Participate in 200 kW Internal Reforming Stack and 1000kW Pilot Plant Development 5.3.2.3. Phase III MCFC Development (2000-2004): Only One Company Remains 5.3.3. MCFC Commercialization in Japan Hopeless 5.4. MCFC Development in Europe 5.4.1. The Netherlands Revives Europe’s MCFC Development Effort in 1986 5.4.1.1. European Union Framework Program Starts Funding Dutch MCFC Efforts in 1987–ECN Takes the Lead 5.4.1.2. The Netherlands Ends MCFC Development in 1999 5.4.2. Italy Starts MCFC R&D also in 1986–Ansaldo Ricerche Takes the Lead 5.4.2.1. EU Framework Program Supporting the Italian MCFC Effort in 1987 5.4.2.2. Ansaldo’s MCFC Commercialization Phase Delayed 5.4.3. Germany Starts MCFC Development in 1988–MBB (Currently CFC Solutions) Takes the Lead 5.4.3.1. EU Framework Program Begins Supporting German MCFC Effort in 1990 5.4.3.2. German Government’s MCFC Demonstration Programs Bolsters HotModule Installations 5.4.3.3. CFC Solutions Shuts Down its MCFC Business in December 2010 5.5. MCFC Development in South Korea 5.5.1. South Korea Begins MCFC Development in 1993 5.5.2. South Korea More Interested in Rapid Acquisition of Foreign MCFC Technology for Domestic Economy and Export Growth 5.5.3. POSCO’s MCFC Strategy Still Unfolding.Too Early to Predict the Outcome References
Chapter 6. History of Solid Oxide Fuel Cells 6.1. Introduction 6.2. US Department of Energy Initiates SOFC R&D Program in 1977 6.2.1. DOE Taps Westinghouse to be Global Leader of SOFC Technology 6.2.1.1. Westinghouse Makes Major Technological Advances in 1995 6.2.1.2. Siemens Acquires Westinghouse and Launches Ambitious Commercialization Plans (1997-2002) 6.2.1.3. Siemens Westinghouse Hits Technical Barriers in the 2000s..Validation of Tubular SOFC Technology Fails 6.2.1.4. Siemens Westinghouse Abandons Tubular SOFC Commercialization, Shuts Down Fuel Cell Business, September 30, 2010 6.2.2. DOE Launches SECA Program in 2001 in Search of New SOFC Technology 6.2.2.1. SECA Sets Off Renewal of Global Interest in SOFCs 6.2.2.2. SECA Soon Encounters Tough Challenges 6.2.2.3. Development of Commercially Viable SOFCs Under SECA Unlikely 6.2.3. Meanwhile, Many US Companies Launch SOFC Development Activities 6.2.3.1. Acumentrics 6.2.3.2. Allied Signal Aerospace 6.2.3.3. Bloom Energy 6.2.3.4. Ceramatec 6.2.3.5. Cummins Power Generation 6.2.3.6. Delphi 6.2.3.7. FuelCell Energy/Versa Power System 6.2.3.8. General Electric 6.2.3.9. Protonex 6.2.3.10. Rolls Royce Fuel Cell Systems 6.2.3.11. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corporation 6.2.3.12. SOFCo 6.2.3.13. Technology Management, Inc 6.2.3.14. UTC Power/Delphi 6.2.3.15. Ztek 6.2.4. US Global SOFC Leadership Position Has Largely Eroded 6.3. Japan Launches SOFC Research in Wake of Oil Crisis 6.3.1. METI Begins Modest Funding of Basic SOFC Research in 1974 6.3.2. METI Launches Long-Term SOFC R&D Programs in 1989 6.3.2.1. SOFC R&D Program Phase I (1989-1991) 6.3.2.2. SOFC R&D Program Phase II (1992-1997) 6.3.2.3. SOFC R&D Program Phase II Extension (1998-2000) 6.3.2.4. SOFC R&D Program Phase III (2001-2004) 6.3.3. MITI Begins Ambitious System Technology Development Program (2004-2007) in 2004 6.3.3.1. System Development Program (2004-2007) 6.3.3.2. Component Technology Development Program (2005-2007) 6.3.3.3. The Post-Program Evaluation Report Judges the 2004-2007 SOFC R&D Program to be an Overall Failure 6.3.4. SOFC Demonstration Research Program (2007-2010): A New Hope for Near-Term SOFC Commercialization 6.3.4.1. Program Helps SOFC Industry Grow 6.3.4.2. Program Results Are Mixed 6.3.5. METI Institutes "Back-to-Basics" Research Program (2008-2012) 6.3.5.1. Program is Subject to Serious Constraints 6.3.6. Still Japanese SOFC Developers Press on with Their Commercialization Plans 6.3.6.1. Acumentrics Japan 6.3.6.2. National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology 6.3.6.3. Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry 6.3.6.4. Fuji Electric 6.3.6.5. Fujikura Cable 6.3.6.6. Kyocera: The Leading SOFC Player in Japan Today 6.3.6.7. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 6.3.6.8. Mitsubishi Materials Corporation/Kansai Electric 6.3.6.9. Mitsui Engineering and Shipbuilding 6.3.6.10. Murata Manufacturing/Osaka Gas 6.3.6.11. NGK Insulators/J-Energy/Sumitomo Precision Products 6.3.6.12. NGK Spark Plugs/AIST/Fine Ceramic Research Association/Toho Gas 6.3.6.13. JX Nippon Oil & Energy/Kyocera 6.3.6.14. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) 6.3.6.15. Sanyo Electric 6.3.6.16. Toho Gas/Sumitomo Precision Products/Nippon Shokubai/Daiichi Kigenso 6.3.6.17. Tonen 6.3.6.18. TOTO/Hitachi/Kyushu Electric/Nippon Steel 6.3.7. Japan’s Initiatives Approach Critical Mass 6.4. Europe Restarts SOFC Development in 1986 6.4.1. Denmark 6.4.1.1. Risø and Haldor Topsoe: Developmental Work in Partnership 6.4.1.2. Forming a Consortium in 2001 for SOFC Commercialization 6.4.1.3. Forming a Topsoe Fuel Cell for SOFC Commercialization in 2004 6.4.1.4. Topsoe Fuel Cell Achieves a Number of Milestones 6.4.1.5. But No discernible commercial Success 6.4.2. Finland 6.4.2.1. Wa¨rtsila¨ Starts SOFC Development in 2000 But Soon Chooses to Outsource SOFC Stacks 6.4.2.2. Wa¨rtsila¨ Optimistic about Commercialization of WFC20 and WFC50 Units 6.4.2.3. But Technology Yet to be Validated 6.4.3. Germany 6.4.3.1. Asea Brown Boveri (ABB): Started SOFC R&D in 1968, Ended in 1993 6.4.3.2. BMW: Begins SOFC R&D in Late 1990s, Ends in Late 2000s 6.4.3.3. Dornier: Begins SOFC R&D in 1988, Ends in 1995 6.4.3.4. Forschungszentrum Julich 6.4.3.5. H.C. Starck/Staxera/Webasto (Enerday) 6.4.3.6. Siemens Efforts: Rise and Fall in 50 years 6.4.4. The Netherlands 6.4.4.1. ECN Starts SOFC Activities in 1987 6.4.4.2. ECN forms InDEC, a spin-off SOFC Ceramic Component Production Company, in 1999 6.4.4.3. InDEC Acquired by German Company H.C. Starck 6.4.5. Switzerland 6.4.5.1. HTceramix Starts as a University Spin-Off in 2000 6.4.5.2. Sulzer/Sulzer Hexis/Hexis 6.4.6. United Kingdom 6.4.6.1. Alstom: Started SOFC R&D in Mid-1990s, Ended in Early 2000s 6.4.6.2. Ceres Power 6.4.6.3. Rolls Royce Fuel Cell Systems 6.4.7. Europe Lacks Clear SOFC Strategy 6.5. Other Countries 6.5.1. Australia 6.5.1.1. CSIRO establishes Ceramic Fuel Cells Limited in 1992 6.5.1.2. CFCL Develops Pre-Commercial Demonstration Units in 2005–Creates Major Interest among Utilities 6.5.1.3. CFCL Establishes Large-Scale Manufacturing Facilities and Component Supply Chains in Europe 6.5.1.4. CFCL Launches New Commercial Product–2 kW BlueGenPower Plant 6.5.1.5. Commercial Success Not Yet Guaranteed 6.4.4.1. ECN Starts SOFC Activities in 1987 6.4.4.2. ECN forms InDEC, a spin-off SOFC Ceramic Component Production Company, in 1999 6.4.4.3. InDEC Acquired by German Company H.C. Starck 6.4.5. Switzerland 6.4.5.1. HTceramix Starts as a University Spin-Off in 2000 6.4.5.2. Sulzer/Sulzer Hexis/Hexis 6.4.6. United Kingdom 6.4.6.1. Alstom: Started SOFC R&D in Mid-1990s, Ended in Early 2000s 6.4.6.2. Ceres Power 6.4.6.3. Rolls Royce Fuel Cell Systems 6.4.7. Europe Lacks Clear SOFC Strategy 6.5. Other Countries 6.5.1. Australia 6.5.1.1. CSIRO establishes Ceramic Fuel Cells Limited in 1992 6.5.1.2. CFCL Develops Pre-Commercial Demonstration Units in 2005–Creates Major Interest among Utilities 6.5.1.3. CFCL Establishes Large-Scale Manufacturing Facilities and Component Supply Chains in Europe 6.5.1.4. CFCL Launches New Commercial Product–2 kW BlueGen Power Plant 6.5.1.5. Commercial Success Not Yet Guaranteed 6.5.5. India 6.5.5.1. Central Glass and Ceramic Research Institute 6.5.5.2. Too Early to Foretell Future Outcome 6.6. Japan Emerges as the Global SOFC Leader; the United States and Europe Follow Behind 6.6.1. Japan Promotes Close Public-Private Collaboration, Greater Breadth of Industrial Expertise and Infrastructure 6.6.2. The United States Loses Its Edge Through the Slow Erosion of Its Base 6.6.3. Europe Is Fragmented, Uncoordinated, and Ineffective 6.6.4. But No Country Has a Viable SOFC Product Yet References
Chapter 7. History of Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cells and Direct Methanol Fuel Cells 7.1. Introduction 7.2. US National Aeronautics and Space Administration Boosts GE’S PEMFC R&D in the late 1950S 7.2.1. GE PEMFCs Fail Manned Space Mission in the late 1960s 7.2.2. New Nafion Membrane Increases PEMFC Efficiency. But GE Abandons PEMFC Effort in 1984 7.3. Canadian Government Decides to Foster Domestic PEMFC Capabilities in the Early 1980s 7.3.1. Canada’s Defense Department Commissions Ballard to Advance GE’s PEMFC Technology in 1983 7.3.1.1. Second Contract Makes Marked Advances toward Practical Applications of PEMFCs 7.3.2. Canada’s Energy Department Sponsors Ballard to Develop PEM Fuel Cell Bus in 1990 7.3.3. Ballard Becomes the Global PEMFC Leader 7.3.3.1. Ballard/Daimler-Benz/Ford Fuel Cell Car Alliance Formed in 1997 7.4. A Global Fuel Cell Race Begins 7.4.1. Major Global Automakers and Bus Manufacturers Join the Race 7.4.1.1. Beijing LN Green Power Company (China) 7.4.1.2. Daihatsu 7.4.1.3. Daimler-Benz (DaimlerChrysler) 7.4.1.4. Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics (DCIP) (China) 7.4.1.5. EvoBus 7.4.1.6. Fiat 7.4.1.7. Ford 7.4.1.8. General Motors 7.4.1.9. Gillig 7.4.1.10. Hino 7.4.1.11. Honda 7.4.1.12. Hyundai 7.4.1.13. Irisbus 7.4.1.14. Man Nutzfahrzeuge (MAN Trucks and Bus) 7.4.1.15. Mazda 7.4.1.16. Mitsubishi Motors 7.4.1.17. NEOPLAN 7.4.1.18. New Flyer Industries 7.4.1.19. Nissan 7.4.1.20. Nova Bus 7.4.1.21. PSA Peugeot Citroen 7.4.1.22. Renault 7.4.1.23. Scania 7.4.1.24. Suzuki 7.4.1.25. Thor Industries (ThunderPower) 7.4.1.26. Toyota 7.4.1.27. Tongji University (China) 7.4.1.28. Tsinghua University (China) 7.4.1.29. Van Hool 7.4.1.30. Volkswagen 7.4.2. Many Governments Join the Race to Boost Domestic PEMFC Capabilities 7.4.2.1. Japanese Government Begins Modest R&D Investment in 1992 7.4.2.2. US Government Launches Ambitious Fuel Cell Car and Hydrogen Technology Initiatives in 2002 7.4.2.3. Europe Recognizes Global Fuel Cell Challenge in Late 1990s 7.4.2.4. Other Governments 7.5. The Global Fuel Cell Race So Far Fails to Attain Commercial Success 7.5.1. Transportation Applications 7.5.1.1. Passenger Cars 7.5.1.2. Buses 7.5.1.3. Material Handling Vehicles 7.5.1.4. Other Transport Applications (Scooters, Bikes, Trains, Marine Vessels, and Aircraft)…Perhaps No Near-Term Commercial Success 7.5.2. Stationary Applications Shore up Only Two Notable Markets 7.5.2.1. Small Residential Combined Heat and Power Market in Japan Sustained by Government Subsidies 7.5.2.2. Backup Power (UPS/Emergency Power/Remote Power) Market in the United States… With Potential Success in the Near Term 7.5.3. Portable Fuel Cell Applications 7.5.3.1. Consumer Electronic Devices Not Yet Commercially Viable 7.5.3.2. Major Success in Toys and Educational Systems...and Beyond 7.5.3.3. SFC Energy: The Global Leader in Portable Auxiliary Power Unit Applications 7.5.4. Conclusion: An Unexpected and Disconcerting Trend 7.5.4.1. Perhaps Current Fuel Cell Technology Is Only Adequate for Niche Market Applications 7.5.4.2. And Not Mature Enough for Primary Market Applications 7.5.4.3. Incremental Improvement Unlikely to Deliver Near-Term Commercial Success in Primary Markets References
Chapter 8. Strengths and Weaknesses of Major Government Fuel Cell R&D Programs: Europe, Japan, and the United States 8.1. Fuel Cell R&D Expenditure: Japan Invests The Most 8.1.1. Government R&D Funding: Japan Outspends the United States and Europe 8.1.2. Private-Sector R&D Investment: Japanese Government and Industry Together Outspend the United States by a Factor of Two; European Government and Industry Together Outspend the United States by 50 percent 8.2. Consistency In Policy And Programs: Japan Is The Most Constant And Stable 8.3. Soundness Of Program Evaluation: US Evaluation Is The Least Valuable 8.4. Resilience In Industry: Europe Is The Least Sturdy 8.4.1. Alkaline Fuel Cells 8.4.2. Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cells 8.4.3. Molten Carbonate Fuel Cells 8.4.4. Solid Oxide Fuel Cells 8.4.5. Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cells 8.5. Fuel Cell Patenting Activity 8.5.1. Japan Grants the Largest Number of Fuel Cell Patents in 2010 8.5.2. Japanese Corporations Expand Dominance in Fuel Cell Patent Activity During the Past Decade 8.6. The Global Fuel Cell Leader Today References
Chapter 9. Policy Recommendations 9.1. Difficulties Of Perfecting Fuel Cell Technology Never Understood 9.2. Until Recently, Science And Physics Too Immature For Fundamental Understanding Of Fuel Cell 9.3. Fuel Cell Knowledge Requires Multiple Scientific Disciplines…But Few Institutions Have Interdisciplinary Research Capabilities 9.3.1. The United States Starts a Small Interdisciplinary PEMFC Basic Research Center in 2007 9.3.2. Japan Launches an Interdisciplinary PEMFC Basic Research Project in 2010 9.3.3. Small Budgets, Short Deadlines, and Overarching Goal of Commercialization Might Inhibit Basic Research 9.4. Fuel Cell Development Requires Three Levels Of Research: Basic Research Supported By Applied Research And Product Development 9.4.1. Forschungszentrum Julich Assigned to Lead EU FP6 Real-SOFC Project to Address Degradation in 2004 9.4.2. AIST Assigned to Lead SOFC Basic Research Project to Address Degradation in 2008 9.4.3. .But Basic Research Limited by Serious Constraints 9.5. Fuel Cell Too Valuable To Abandon: Go Back To Basics Now 9.6. Learning from Past Experience To Plan Future Course Of Action 9.6.1. Past Spending 9.6.2. An Exemplar in History: The Manhattan Project 9.6.2.1. Preceded by Nobel Prize-Class Nuclear Fission Basic Research in the 1930s 9.6.2.2. The Manhattan Project–An Applied Research and Development Project–Began in 1939 9.7. Policy Recommendations: Implementation Of The National Fuel Cell Development Project 9.7.1. Basic Research: A Central and Vital Mission 9.7.2. Budget and Research Period: $2 Billion a Year for 5 Years 9.7.3. Giving a New Mission to National and Industry R&D Labs 9.7.3.1. Appointing Selected National Laboratories, Universities, and Their Research Cadre for Basic Research: At least 2000 Top-Notch Scientists and Physicists from All Related Disciplines 9.7.3.2. Enlisting Fuel Cell Industry for Applied Research and Product Development 9.7.4. The NFCDP as Top National Energy Security Priority 9.7.5. Three Possible National Options for the NFCDP Project Implementation 9.7.5.1. German Option 9.7.5.2. Japanese Option 9.7.5.3. US Option 9.7.6. The Outlook–Japan Will Likely Emerge as First Global Fuel Cell Market Leader for the Next Decade–But the World Will Be the Ultimate Winner References
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